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Abstract 
This research examines the influence of the European Union (EU) in international financial 
harmonisation over the last two decades. It asks why the EU ‘uploads’ international financial 
regulation in some (few) cases, ‘downloads’ it in (many) other cases, or neither uploads or download 
rules. It sets up an analytical framework that combines the concepts of ‘international regulatory 
capacity’ and ‘EU regulatory capacity’, considering their variation across financial services as well as 
over time. Such a framework is then concisely applied to a variety of significant empirical case studies 
of prudential regulation of banking, securities, and insurance. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis that began in the US in 2007 and subsequently spread worldwide 
brought into the spotlight the political salience of financial governance. The regulation of 
financial services has become increasingly complex due to the internationalisation or 
globalisation of finance (Cerny 1995; Cohen 1996; Helleiner 1994) and the large numbers of 
international, regional, transnational and national public and private regulatory bodies 
involved (Porter 2005, 2003). The governance of financial services is characterised by two 
main interrelated regulatory phenomena: the interaction between institutions and rule-making 
processes across multiple arenas, and the ‘accommodation’ or ‘coexistence’ of their outputs.  
 
This multifaceted regulatory process is complicated further in regional jurisdictions, such as 
the European Union (EU), where an extra (supranational) level of regulation exists, beside 
that taking place in national, international and transnational arenas. Over the 2000s, the EU 
has devoted considerable efforts to the completion of the single financial market in Europe, 
promoting regulatory harmonisation within its borders and strengthening the institutional 
framework for financial regulation and supervision (Donnelly 2010; Mügge 2010; Macartney 
2010, 2009; Posner 2009; Quaglia 2010). In so doing, the EU has become one of the largest 
financial jurisdictions in the world.  
 
Amongst regional regulatory regimes, the EU is by far the most advanced because its rules 
(directives or regulations), are legally binding in the member states, the European 
Commission is in charge of monitoring their implementation, and the European Court of 
Justice has jurisdiction on the compliance with those rules. Furthermore, the establishment of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 and the Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) in 1999 have given new momentum to financial market integration and regulation in 
the EU, facilitated by the establishment of a new rule-making framework, the so-called 
Lamfalussy architecture, as explained in Section 3. 
 
This research evaluates the influence of the EU in international financial harmonisation, 
defined as the approximation of regulation across jurisdictions through the deliberate creation 
of international standards (see Drezner 2007; Simmons 2001; Singer 2007). The focus on 
international harmonisation is explained by the fact that financial services are inherently 
borderless. Therefore, their effective regulation requires to some extent harmonised rules 
across jurisdictions to prevent regulatory gaps and arbitrage, but also to facilitate cross-border 
activities (Bach 2010). Yet, international regulatory harmonisation has transaction costs when 
it is negotiated and it has implementation costs when domestic rules are changed to comply 
with either international rules or rules from third countries (Simmons 1998).  
 
The research starts with a puzzle: in some (few) cases, the EU ‘uploads’ its financial services 
regulation internationally; in other (many) cases, the EU ‘downloads’ international financial 
rules; in some instances, neither uploading or downloading take place. ‘Downloading’ is 
defined in this research as the incorporation of international financial ‘soft’ rules (standards, 
principles, guidelines) into EU legislation. ‘Uploading’ is defined as the incorporation of EU 
legislation (or parts of it) into international financial regulation. Why does the EU upload 
international financial regulation in some (few) cases and download it in (many) other cases? 
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More broadly, what is the influence of the EU in international financial harmonisation? Has 
this changed over time, especially after the EMU, and the single financial market, or after the 
global financial crisis? 
 
Academically, there is a major gap in the EU literature and in the international political 
economy literature, which so far have not paid enough attention to the influence of the EU in 
regulating global finance (for some exceptions, see Bach and Newman 2007; Posner and 
Véron 2010; Posner 2009, 2010). From a policy-oriented point of view, some of the most 
salient issues in world politics today concern the making of international regulation and 
regulatory disputes (Drezner 2007: 6; Farrell and Newman 2010).  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 takes stock from the scholarly literature, and 
outlines the research design. Section 3 empirically discusses the main explanatory variables, 
namely EU regulatory capacity and international regulatory capacity. Section 5 examines a 
variety of case studies of international financial harmonisation, with a view to assesses the 
predictive power of the analytical framework.  
 
 
2. State of the Art and Research Design 
 
The early academic literature on international financial regulatory harmonisation has stressed 
the importance of the preferences and the power of the ‘hegemonic’ country, the US, for or 
against international harmonisation (Simmons 2001). The assumption is that international 
regulatory cooperation benefits some countries more than others, and has therefore 
redistributive implications (Oatley and Nabors 1998).1 Hence, international cooperation and 
regulatory harmonisation will take place only when they are in line with the preferences of the 
US, reflecting its market power. Subsequently, other works have questioned the hegemony of 
the US in regulating global finance by considering other jurisdictions that have large financial 
markets, such as the UK and Japan (Singer 2004, 2007) and more recently the EU (Drezner 
2007). Like Simmons, these works mainly focus on market size in order to explain the 
bargaining power of the various jurisdictions. In several financial services, however, the EU 
has the same market size of the US, with the exception of securities markets, reflecting the 
bank based nature of financial systems in continental Europe (Allen and Gale 2000) (see 
Table 1). 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
A less state-centric perspective emphasises the role of private sector governance in financial 
services (Tsingou 2010, 2008; Underhill and Zhang 2008; Underhill et al. 2010). According 
to this perspective, international regulatory convergence reflects the interests of industry, i.e. 
the rules that financial industry finds more advantageous (or less burdensome). It is 
undoubtedly true that the financial industry is a powerful lobbyist, with plenty of financial, 
human and technical resources at its disposal (Baker 2010). However, this explanation is 
more problematic if one considers the diversified interests of industry on several key 
                                                     
1 This approach contradicts early ‘functionalist’ explanations of international financial harmonisation, such as Kapstein’s 
(1992) account of the making of the Basel I accord, which argued that regulators promote international regulatory 
harmonisation as a way to solve common problems or to realise joint gains.   
The European Union and Global Financial Harmonisation 
3 
regulatory issues. For example, in the negotiations of the Basel III accord, banks had different 
preferences depending on their business model and the configuration of the national financial 
system in which they operated, as explained in Section 4. 
 
Recent historical institutionalist works on international market regulation (see Bach and 
Newman 2010a, 2007; Mattli and Büthe 2003; Posner 2009, 2010) have challenged the 
market power explanation, arguing that ‘domestic regulatory institutions are the sources of 
both power and preferences on the global stage’ (Drezner 2010: 794). A key concept used by 
this literature is ‘regulatory capacity’ defined as ‘a jurisdiction’s ability to formulate, monitor, 
and enforce a set of market rules’ (Bach and Newman 2007: 831). It links market size to 
power in international market regulation because neither market size alone nor regulatory 
capacity alone are sufficient to regulate a certain market (Bach and Newman 2007).  
 
In line with the historical institutionalist literature reviewed above, the key explanatory 
variable in this research is ‘regulatory capacity’. This concept can be applied not only to 
national jurisdictions but also, ceteris paribus, to regional polities, such as the EU. It can also 
be applied to international bodies, which, however, do not produce legally binding legislation 
and hence, by definition, have weaker regulatory capacity compared to national jurisdictions – 
in particular, they lack enforcement powers.  
 
In this research, regulatory capacity comprises two main institutional aspects. This first 
concerns the bodies regulating specific financial services: their date of establishment (the 
older the regulatory bodies, the stronger their regulatory capacity); their membership, that is 
whether they have ‘club’ or ‘universal’ membership, and the level of seniority of their 
members (the more restricted and the more senior the membership of the regulatory bodies, 
the stronger their regulatory capacity); the resources at their disposal, such as recognised 
expertise and human resources (the greater the expertise enjoyed by the regulatory bodies, the 
stronger their regulatory capacity); and their legal powers, such as the authority to monitor 
implementation and to impose costs for non-compliance.  
 
The second component concerns the rules issued by those bodies: the presence of policy-
templates concerning specific financial services creates a first mover regulatory advantage, 
setting in place a process of path-dependency, and strengthening the regulatory capacity of the 
bodies that issued those rules. The scope of application of such rules is also important, in 
particular whether they can exclude financial actors headquartered in other jurisdictions (the 
presence of equivalence clauses strengthen the regulatory capacity of the bodies that issued 
those rules). 
 
A two by two explanatory matrix can be created, with weak/strong EU regulatory capacity on 
one side and weak/strong international regulatory capacity on the other (Table 2). The 
harmonisation of international financial regulation and the role of the EU therein depend on 
the combination of EU and international regulatory capacities.  
 
When EU regulatory capacity is weak and international regulatory capacity is strong, the EU 
will mainly download international rules, performing a ‘passive’ role in international financial 
harmonisation. When the EU regulatory capacity is strong and international regulatory 
capacity is weak, the EU is able to upload its rules, performing an ‘active’ role in international 
financial harmonisation. When both the EU and the international regulatory capacities are 
strong, the EU downloads international rules, but has an active-passive role in international 
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regulatory harmonisation.  When EU and international regulatory capacities are weak, neither 
uploading or downloading take place. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
This research design considers EU and international regulatory capacities as independent 
variables: their different combinations give rise to different values of the dependent variable, 
namely the role of the EU in international financial harmonisation. However, what can 
explain the existence of different regulatory capacities? This question, which considers 
regulatory capacity as the dependent variable to be explained, goes beyond the scope of this 
paper. Nonetheless, drawing from the literature on EU financial regulation and international 
financial harmonisation, the building up of regulatory capacity in the EU and internationally 
can be explained by the role of powerful policy-entrepreneurs and the convergent (or at least 
compatible) interests of the main jurisdictions and their industry, as detailed in the following 
section.  
 
The selection of cases for empirical research ensures variation between the explanatory 
variables, namely EU regulatory capacity (strong/weak) and international regulatory capacity 
(strong/weak), and the dependent variable, that is uploading, downloading, neither. The unit 
of analysis are sets of rules that represent significant regulatory developments across financial 
services and they are of interest in their own right. They all concern prudential issues: that is 
capital requirements for banks, investment firms and insurers. Prudential regulation is a key 
component of financial regulation and given its implications for systemic stability there are 
considerable incentives for international regulatory harmonisation and cooperation. The case 
studies cover the period from the late 1980s, to the establishment of EMU and the completion 
of the EU financial market, to the post global financial crisis. Hence, they provide snapshots 
of EU role in international financial harmonisation over time and across the main segments of 
the financial sector. 
 
Methodologically, the paper uses the congruence procedure across case studies and within 
case studies over time (George and Bennett 2005). Hence, the hypotheses or empirical 
expectations derived from Table 1 are assessed against the empirical record of the case 
studies, to confirm (or not) at first cut the explanatory power of the framework. Some process 
tracing is also carried out with a view to explaining how the building up of EU regulatory 
capacity affected its ability to influence international regulation. As mentioned before, this 
aspect is often overlooked in the literature. These are ‘plausibility probes’ rather than 
systematic tests, which would require a much longer piece of research in order to present all 
the empirical evidence.     
 
 
3. Regulatory Capacity in the EU and Internationally 
 
EU Regulatory Capacity 
Since the late 1970s, financial market integration in the EU has gone hand in hand with the 
building up of regulatory capacity: it was mostly a process of deregulation at the national 
level and reregulation at the EU level (Jabko 2006). The main change in EU regulatory 
capacity took place in the 2000s, following the FSAP and the Lamfalussy process. 
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The rules (mainly directives, which then have to be adopted by the member states in national 
legislation) issued by the EU in the 1970s sanctioned the right of establishment for banks, 
subject to host country control. In the 1980s, the ‘home country’ principle was introduced in 
EU legislation, meaning that financial firms could operate across the EU on the basis of rules 
set by the country where firm headquarters were located (Story and Walter 1997). After the 
re-launch of the Single Market in the mid-1980s and prior to 1999, financial services 
regulation in the EU was based on the principle of national regulation, coupled with ‘mutual 
recognition’ and ‘minimal harmonisation’ of national rules through EU rules (Padoa-Schioppa 
2004). EU rules were issued through a cumbersome legislative process: the European 
Commission proposed legislation, which was co-decided by the Council and the EP. The 
negotiations on technical details could last for decades, sometimes with no agreement, as in 
the case of accounting standards (Leblond 2011). Some advisory committees composed of 
national regulators, such as the Banking Advisory Committee, advised the Commission, but 
had very limited resources and expertise and no real power.2 
 
The so-called Lamfalussy reform in the early 2000s changed the rule-making process in 
banking, securities and insurance (Mügge 2006; Quaglia 2007). In the new architecture, the 
Council and EP codecided framework (level 1) rules, whereas implementing measures were 
adopted by the Commission through the ‘comitology’ process, which involved committees of 
member states representatives (the so-called level 2 committees). Committees of national 
regulators (the so-called level 3 committees) were established to advise the Commission on 
the adoption of level 1 and 3 measures. They also had implementation tasks and could adopt 
non-legally binding standards and guidelines. This institutional change sped up the rule 
making process for the adoption of the forty or so legislative measures envisaged in the 
FSAP. Moreover, the level 3 committees composed of national regulators came to enjoy 
authority and legitimacy vis-à-vis public and private actors because of their membership, 
expertise and contacts with market participants (Posner and Véron 2010: 405). The 
completion of EMU gave new impetus to financial market integration in the EU. However, 
the establishment of the ECB did not have direct effect on regulatory capacity in the banking 
sector, given the fact that banking regulation and supervision were not transferred to the ECB 
and the responsibility for supervision basically remained at the national level.  
 
From the early 2000s onwards, the completion of the single financial market was achieved 
through a set of legislative measures that in many cases aimed at maximum harmonisation 
(Ferran 2004). These measures mainly focused on securities markets, in which the EU had 
lagged behind the US.3 In the US, the powerful Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
established in 1934, had clearly assigned competences and consolidated expertise in 
regulating securities markets. US legislation to a large extent informed the content of EU 
rules in this period (Posner and Véron 2010).  
 
By contrast, in the insurance sector, the EU was a pace setter when compared to the US. The 
Solvency II directive (European Parliament and Council of Ministers 2009), proposed in 2007 
and agreed by the Council and the EP in 2009, set in place a state of the art risk-based, 
principle-based approach to the prudential regulation of insurance companies. It replaced the 
outdated Solvency I directive that, unlike Solvency II, was based on minimum harmonisation. 
                                                     
2 The equivalent of the BAC in securities markets, the Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO) was defined by 
its former director as a ‘group of nice people getting together’ (interview). 
3 For an historical overview of the link between international rules and securities market legislation in the EU, see Coleman 
and Underhill 1998. 
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Solvency II was the first directive in the insurance sector adopted through the Lamfalussy 
architecture, which facilitated its adoption (interview). Insurance regulation was quite 
outdated in the US and was competence of (state) legislators (Singer 2007). Attempts, for 
example by the NAIC, to transfer regulatory competence to the federal level and to modernise 
the legislation, were short-lived (see the Solvency Modernisation Initiative SMI 2008).4  
 
In 2002, the EU adopted far reaching legislation about the consolidated supervision of 
financial conglomerates (European Parliament and Council of Ministers 2002), which are 
financial entities that combine banking and insurance. By contrast, there was not consolidated 
financial conglomerates supervision in the US. The use of equivalence clauses in Solvency II 
and the Financial Conglomerates directive gave the European Commission new bargaining 
power vis-a-vis the US because the Commission was in charge of making decisions about the 
equivalence (or otherwise) of rules in third countries, including the US (Dür 2011; Posner 
2009).  
 
To sum up, prior to 2000s, the EU had (relatively) weak regulatory capacity across all 
financial services. This capacity increased as a consequence of the Lamafalussy reform and 
the FSAP. Afterwards, the EU enjoyed a first mover regulatory advantage by setting in place 
state of the art regulation in insurance and financial conglomerates. In the case of securities 
markets, the EU mainly caught up with the US. What explains the strengthening of the EU 
regulatory capacity in the 2000s? It was a process led by the Commission, eager to complete 
the single financial market (Jabko 2006; Posner 2009). It enjoyed the support of the main 
member states (Quaglia 2010), with a view to boost European financial centres in the global 
competition with the US. The most transnational part of the financial industry was also keen 
to reap the benefit of a single European market (Macartney 2010, 2009; Mügge 2010). For 
example, the main European insures supported the Solvency II directive because it was 
expected to reduce solvency requirements for large insurance groups (see CEA 2007a,b).  
Therefore, the entrepreneurship of the Commission, and the converging interests of the 
member states and their financial industry account for the strengthening of the EU regulatory 
capacity in the 2000s.  
 
 
International Regulatory Capacity 
International regulatory bodies inherently have a weaker regulatory capacity than national 
jurisdictions or regional jurisdictions, such as the EU, because they do not have legal 
personality; the international rules they issue are not legally binding; and they lack 
enforcement power. There are, however, variations across financial services.5 
 
Amongst international regulatory bodies, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), dating back to 1975, has the greatest regulatory capacity because of its composition 
and the world-wide acceptance of its rules. It is a self-selected group of senior central bankers 
and banking supervisors from a limited number of countries. Until 2010, it was a ‘club’ of 
(some) developed countries (G 10), which shared several regulatory preferences (Drezner 
                                                     
4 The NAIC’s Solvency Modernisation Initiative (SMI) began in June 2008. The SMI is a critical self-examination of the 
United States’ insurance solvency regulation framework, http://www.naic.org/index_smi.htm accessed in June 2011. 
5 Büthe (2008) perceptively notes that researchers should pay more attention to the international institutions regulating global 
capital. 
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2007). In 2010, it was enlarged to all the member countries of the G 20. The European 
Commission and the ECB have observer status in the BCBS.  
 
Despite its small staff hosted at the BIS, the BCBS has recognised expertise in banking 
regulation (Kerwer 2005; Wood 2005), largely through the input produced by its working 
groups of national regulators, which discuss the technical details of regulation and meet 
regularly. The final version of the Basel accords is eventually negotiated and agreed at the 
level of governors and chairman of the supervisory authorities (or their deputies). Generally, 
these members have the ability to enact international rules domestically and tend to be 
independent from the political authorities. Moreover, central bankers, who compose the bulk 
of the Committee, have an established ability to cooperate and are relatively insulated from 
domestic politics (Tsinguo 2010).  Although the BCBS does not have enforcement powers, it 
has implementation working groups that monitor how its capital rules are put into practice 
across jurisdictions. The BCBS first set international capital requirements in the late 1980s 
(the Basel I accord) and continued to do so afterwards through the Basel II and Basel III 
accords, all of which had de facto worldwide implementation.  
 
The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) have weak regulatory capacity, as compared to 
their counterpart in banking. They were established in 19836 and 1993, respectively. Whereas 
no EU representative as such sits in the IOSCO, the European Commission is a member of the 
IAIS, without voting power. These fora have ‘universal’ membership, encompassing more 
than 100 national jurisdictions, which means that a variety of different regulatory preferences 
are represented, often slowing and watering down the rule-making process. Unlike the BCBS, 
the IAIS and IOSCO meet at the very senior level only once a year and do not enjoy the same 
level of recognised expertise as the BCBS.  
 
One important difference between the IOSCO and the IAIS is that in the former the influence 
of the SEC is predominant because of the power it enjoys at the domestic level and its cutting 
edge expertise (Bach 2010). For example, whenever a new idea comes up in the IOSCO 
discussions, the SEC usually has a well prepared dossier on it (interview). The EU as such is 
not represented in IOSCO and until the early 1990s, some EU countries did not have 
securities regulators, or at any rate the power and resources at their disposal were rather 
limited, as in the case of Germany or Italy. Unlike securities and banking, insurance is 
entirely a state competence in the US, not a federal competence. Thus, in the IAIS, the US is 
represented by the NAIC & 56 jurisdictions. The NAIC is not a federal regulatory body, 
hence is often unable to project a unified US position in the IAIS7 and cannot guarantee 
uniformity and consistency in the domestic implementation of internationally agreed rules 
(Singer 2007).  
 
To sum up, international bodies have weaker regulatory capacity than national (or in the case 
of the EU) regional jurisdictions. The main exception is the BCBS. What accounts for its 
strong(ish) regulatory capacity as compared to other international financial regulatory bodies? 
When the BCBS was established, the US and the UK acted as policy entrepreneurs, putting 
                                                     
6  However, the IOSCO’s predecessor dated back to the 1970s. 
7 According to the IAIS statute, the NAIC does not have a right to vote; and (b) the NAIC may, at any one time, 
designate up to a maximum of 15 of its members who may exercise their rights to vote (art 6.4) 
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their weight and capabilities behind it (Simmons 2001; Wood 2005). Indeed, for the first 15 
years or so, the chairs of the BCBS mainly came from the US and the UK. Once established, 
the BCBS acquired an institutional status and regulatory capacity on its own, becoming more 
than the sum of its (club-like) components. By contrast the US did not act as a policy 
entrepreneur to strengthen the regulatory capacity of IOSCO (Underhill 1995). The US would 
have had the capability but not the interest to do so: the SEC regulated the largest financial 
market in the world and was already at the centre of a dense network of bilateral Memoranda 
of Understanding (MoUs) (Bach and Newman 2010b). To fulfil its domestic mandate, the 
SEC did not need a stronger IOSCO (Simmons 2001). In the case of the IAIS the US did not 
have the interest or the capability to beef up the regulatory capacity of this international body 
(Singer 2007).  
 
Unlike EU regulatory capacity, international regulatory capacity has not changed substantially 
over time. The IOSCO remains principally a forum for cooperation, especially through 
multilateral and bilateral MoUs, and facilitates information exchange. In the wake of the 
financial crisis, the IOSCO was unable to define rules for CRAs, other than revising the 
voluntary code of conduct already in place (IOSCO 2008). Its report on hedge funds 
regulation was equally bland. Since the mid-2000s, the EU has been keen to prop up the 
regulatory capacity of the IAIS (interview). The near failure of the largest insurer in the word 
headquartered in the US, the AIG, has given new ammunition to those calling for 
international solvency rules for insurers.  
 
 
4. Uploading and Downloading Financial Regulation 
 
In banking, the most important standards concern capital requirements for banks, which were 
agreed for the first time by the BCBS in the Basel I accord (1988) ‘International convergence 
of capital measurement and capital standards’. This was replaced by the Basel II accord 
(BCBS 2005), which was followed by the Basel III accord (BCBS 2010) in the wake of the 
global financial crisis. The content of these accords has periodically been incorporated by the 
EU into the capital requirements directives, revised over time, so as to take into account the 
regulatory changes introduced by the successive Basel accords. In all these cases, there has 
been a downloading of international rules by the EU, but with some important differences 
over time.  
 
The Basel I was to a large extent imposed by a US-UK alliance, eager to enforce international 
capital requirements onto reluctant continental European countries and other G 10 
jurisdictions (Oatley and Nabors 1998). Following the Latin America debt crisis, the US had 
unilaterally introduced higher capital requirements domestically. US policy makers and US 
banks, worried about international competitiveness, were keen to extend capital requirements 
to banks in other jurisdictions (Kapstein 1989; Simmons 2001; Singer 2007). The EU (at that 
time the EC) did not have its own set of capital requirements, which varied considerably 
across member states (Underhill 1997). Indeed, they could not even agree on a common 
definition of ‘capital’, a problem that surfaced in the negotiations of the Basel I accord (Wood 
2005). In the end, the Basel I accord did not provide a common definition of capital, nor did 
Basel II succeed in doing so. Basel III rather controversially did. 
 
Lacking its own rules, the EU decided to incorporate Basel I into legally binding EU 
legislation. In this case, the downloading of international rules was a way for the EU to 
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overcome its internal inability to reach an agreement, due to the different regulatory templates 
in place in the member states. The initial downloading of international rules set in motion a 
process of path dependence. Having gone through the process of implementing the Basel I 
standards (and having sustained the costs of doing so), it would have been very costly for the 
EU to come up with its own independent set of capital requirements afterward (interview). 
The downloading of international banking rules was the result of the weak EU regulatory 
capacity and the strong(ish) regulatory capacity of the BCBS, which enjoyed the support of 
the US, and UK and could ‘bank’ on the expertise of senior banking regulators. European 
policy-makers had very limited influence on the content of Basel I: for the most part they had 
had to accept what was on offer.  
 
Fast-forward to the Basel III accord (2010). The new rules almost triple the regulatory capital 
for banks, even though they will be phased in gradually from January 2013 until 2019. In the 
negotiations on Basel III, the ‘old’ (i.e. Basel I) divide re-emerged between the US and the 
UK on the one side, and continental countries on the other side (interviews; Financial Times, 
15 February 2011). The US and the UK wanted: a stricter definition of capital, to be limited to 
ordinary shares; higher capital requirements, including capital buffers; a leverage ratio; 
liquidity rules; a short transition period.  Continental countries, in particular France and 
Germany wanted: a broader definition of capital, including hybrids and silent participations; 
lower capital requirements, arguing that ‘traditional’ (continental) banks engaged in less risky 
trade finance/financial activities. They opposed the leverage ratio, asked for a modification of 
certain aspects of the liquidity rules and wanted a longer transition period (interviews; 
Financial Times, 15 February 2011). Continental policy-makers were worried about the effect 
on the real economy of stricter rules on banks’ capital, which were instead advocated by 
Anglo Saxon regulators.  They were also eager to set in place capital rules that would not 
disrupt the business model of their banks and banking system (Howarth and Quaglia 2012).8 
 
Despite attempts by the Commission to forge a common position, the EU presented a 
disjointed stance during the Basel III negotiations (interviews). Not only did the EU not have 
its own set of capital rules to upload, but also its attempt to project a unified position in the 
Basel negotiations was hampered by the different configuration of the financial industry 
across the member states and by the fact bank-industry links are particularly strong on the 
continent. Unlike Basel I, which was mostly a US-UK ‘diktat’, Basel III was a compromise 
between the positions of the two coalitions at play. 
 
Over time, the EU has strengthened its regulatory capacity in the banking sector through the 
creation of the level 3 Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) and ECB. 
Neither of these bodies, however, nor the Commission have direct supervisory competences. 
Moreover, the EU does not have its own rules on capital, hence it has nothing to upload 
internationally. By contrast, the BCBS has consolidated its regulatory capacity over time and 
its rules (the Basel accords) have become more detailed (Basel I was 30 pages, Basel II was 
347 pages). In the downloading of Basel III rules several issues controversially settled (or 
papered over) in the BCBS were reopened in EU negotiations. Some member states, most 
notably the UK (Financial Times, 21 July 2011), but also international bodies, such as the 
IMF (2011), complained that the drafted EU capital rules, currently under discussion, 
diverged significantly from the content of Basel III.  
 
                                                     
8 For example, the definition of capital proposed by the BCBS was not suitable for German or French mutual banks. 
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‘Capital Adequacy Standards for Securities Firms’ were drafted by the Technical Committee 
of IOSCO in 1989 (IOSCO 1989), after years of preparation. Eventually, they were not 
adopted by the IOSCO General Assembly. The rationale for the proposed rules was to set in 
place international capital requirements for investment firms similar to those already agreed 
for banks. The main problem during the negotiations was that there were three competing 
national regulatory templates being proposed by the main jurisdictions, which tried to upload 
their rules internationally (Singer 2004, 2007). These templates were: the ‘comprehensive 
approach’ applied by the SEC in the US; the ‘portfolio approach’ used in the UK; and the 
‘building block approach’ adopted by the BCBS in the Basel I accord. The latter was 
supported by the European Commission and was subsequently incorporated into the capital 
requirement directive (Dimson and Marsh 1995). Initially, the EU member states were 
divided on this issue, but eventually coalesced in supporting the building block approach.  
 
Negotiations in the IOSCO were initially influenced by the US, favouring a comprehensive 
approach. Subsequently, a compromise in favour of a building block approach was agreed 
between the BCBS and the IOSCO as the basis for an international agreement (BCBS and 
IOSCO 1992 cited in Dimson and Marsh 1995). Then the problem became to establish the 
parameters of the building block approach, the choice being between the ‘4+8’ formula 
supported by the US and the ‘2+8’ formula supported by the Europeans and used into the 
CAD. Both the BCBS and the European Commission hoped that this formula would form the 
base for the agreement within the IOSCO (Dimson and Marsh 1995). However, this was not 
to be the case.  
 
European regulators, led by Britain's Securities and Investments Board, argued that the 
parameter proposed by IOSCO according to the 4+8 formula were too high, leading to 
excessive capital requirement as compared to existing capital requirements in European 
countries (The Economist, 31 October 1992). By contrast, the SEC held out for the 4+8 
formula, deemed the 2+8 parameter proposed by the EU as too low, as compared to the 
existing capital requirements in the US. The chairman of the SEC argued that Drexel 
Burnham, a securities firm that collapsed in 1990, would not have been able to meet its 
obligations if lower capital ratios had been in place, as proposed by the IOSCO (The 
Economist, 5 October 1991).  
 
The additional problem for the SEC was that whereas securities firms in the EU were subject 
to consolidated supervision, broker-dealers in the US were not subject to consolidated 
supervision. According to Singer (2007), one of the reasons why the European and in 
particular the British authorities were so keen on harmonising capital standards for securities 
firms worldwide was that it was felt that the proposed rules would have affected the way in 
which supervision was conducted in the US, moving it toward a consolidated model, as was 
already the case in Europe. At the last minute, the SEC pulled out of the talks and the deal fell 
apart.  
 
The lack of international harmonisation meant that national jurisdictions were left free to set 
their own rules concerning the capital requirements of investment firms. The EU decided to 
apply the capital requirements for banks to investment firms, basically downloading Basel I 
(and subsequently Basel II and Basel III) to the securities sector (Underhill 1997). On that 
occasion, the EU presented a lack of unity, because there were no EU rules on the matter and 
different models were used across Europe to calculate capital requirements for investment 
firms (Dimson and Marsh 1995). The Lamfalussy reform and the implementation of the FASP 
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strengthened the EU regulatory capacity in this sector. In the meantime, however, the EU had 
already downloaded Basel rules to banks and investment firms alike, and it would have been 
costly for the EU to set in place its own rules at this later stage. 
 
In insurance, the Lamfalussy reform and the implementation of the FASP strengthened the 
EU regulatory capacity. By contrast, international capacity remained rather weak, though 
there were some (mainly EU) attempts to build it up (interviews). In this case, the EU was the 
first mover, reforming its framework for insurance regulation and supervision, setting in place 
solvency requirements (that is capital requirements for insurers), without waiting for 
international standards.  The state of the art solvency legislation adopted by the EU provided a 
first mover advantage in shaping embryonic international solvency standards and more 
broadly in setting the international regulatory agenda. 
 
The Solvency II directive applies to all life and non-life insurance undertakings and 
reinsurance undertakings, streamlining EU legislation by replacing 14 existing directives 
regulating insurance services with a single directive (European Parliament and Council of 
Ministers 2009). The Solvency II approach is articulated across three pillars that deliberately 
resemble the three-pillar structure of the Basel II accord that set international capital 
requirements for banks. The first pillar outlines two capital requirements, which have 
different purposes and are calibrated accordingly: the Solvency Capital Requirement, which 
enables an institution to absorb significant unforeseen losses, and the Minimum Capital 
Requirement, below which supervisory action is triggered. Subject to supervisory approval, 
insurers can use their own internal model to calculate capital requirements. The second pillar 
of the Solvency II directive consists of a supervisory review process of the overall financial 
position of insurance undertakings. The third pillar outlines requirements concerning the 
disclosure of information, with a view to impose market discipline on insurance undertakings. 
The directive established group supervision, whereby a single authority is to be appointed 
with coordination and decision powers for each insurance group. The group supervisor has 
primary responsibility for key aspects of group supervision (group solvency, intragroup 
transactions, etc.), to be exercised in cooperation and consultation with host supervisors 
(European Parliament and Council of Ministers 2009).  
 
It is noteworthy that the Solvency II directive contains clauses concerning the equivalence (or 
otherwise) of third countries legislation, to be decided by the European Commission 
following the advice of the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Supervisors (CEIOPS, now transformed into an authority). In the case of non-equivalence, 
non EU insurers would be able to operate in the EU only by setting up subsidiaries with 
sufficient capital, without relying on group capital. Hence, the scope of EU rules 
contemplated the possibility of excluding foreign insurers from the benefit on the new 
solvency rules, giving the Commission and CEIOPS enforcement powers. 
 
The EU model differs widely from the regulatory model in place in the US. It adopts a risk-
based, principle-based approach, whereas the US model uses a mix of rule-based and risk-
based evaluations. EU legislation adopts the concept of Enterprise Risk Management’ (ERM ) 
and relies on market valuation of assets and liabilities, whereas in the US the valuation of 
assets and liabilities is based on principles and rules. Unlike in the US, the EU envisages the 
use of internal model of insurers to calculate capital requirements. Similarly, the EU relies on 
targeting solvency capital to specific confidence levels; it is not so in the US. EU legislation 
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establishes group supervision, to be performed by colleges of supervisors, whereas in the US 
there is no group calculation of solvency requirements and group supervision.  
 
It is remarkable that key topics of the IAIS regulatory agenda from the mid-2000s onwards, 
namely, ‘Enterprise Risk Management’ (ERM) (IAIS 2008c, d), ‘Structure of regulatory 
capital’ (IAIS 2008 a,b; IAIS 2009c,d); ‘Use of internal models’ (IAIS 2008e,f); ‘Group 
supervision’ (IAIS 2009a,b; 2010), ‘Mutual recognition of supervisory regimes’ (IAIS 
2008g), very much reflected EU priorities and perspectives, not the US regulatory model. Key 
concepts of the Solvency II approach, such as the ERM, market valuation of assets and 
liabilities, technical provisions, calibration of solvency capital to specific confidence levels, 
choice of internal model or standardised model, group supervision, found their way into IAIS 
standards and guidelines (interviews). The IAIS’s guidance paper on principles of group wide 
supervision borrowed from the group regime painstakingly negotiated in the Solvency II 
directive (Financial Times, 10 June 2008; interview).  
 
The IAIS paper on mutual recognition (2008g) provided guidance on cross-border recognition 
of reinsurance supervision with a view to convince the US to abolish its regime for alien (non 
US) insurers. The purpose of the IAIS guidance was ‘to allow a supervisor to recognise the 
value of the supervision exercised by another jurisdiction and thus remove significant 
amounts of unnecessary regulatory and supervisory requirements for reinsurers’ (2008g: p. 1). 
Reportedly, the Commission and the UK representative were instrumental in pushing this 
issue onto the IAIS agenda (interviews).9 The main international reinsurers are headquartered 
in the EU, first and foremost in London. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Preliminary results from the congruence procedure largely confirm the empirical expectations 
derived from the analytical framework. A combination of weak EU regulatory capacity and 
strong international regulatory capacity leads to the downloading of international rules by the 
EU, as in the case of the Basel I accord in banking. A combination of strong EU and 
international regulatory capacities leads to the downloading of international rules by the EU. 
This however, increases its bargaining power in the making of those rules. A combination of 
weak EU and international regulatory capacities means that neither uploading nor 
downloading take place, as in the case of the failed agreement on capital requirements for 
investment firms. A combination of strong EU regulatory capacity and weak international 
regulatory capacity facilitates the uploading of EU rules internationally, as in the case of the 
embryonic rules on capital (solvency) requirements for insurers.  
 
The EU can further international regulatory harmonisation in a passive way, that is by 
downloading international rules, or in an active way, namely by uploading its rules to 
international bodies. The latter instance has so far been less common, because the US had an 
almost hegemonic role in international finance in the past and enjoyed strong regulatory 
capacity in banking and securities markets, less so in insurance. The strengthening of EU 
regulatory capacity, especially in areas where the US regulatory capacity is rather weak, as in 
the case of insurance, enables the EU to exert a stronger influence than would otherwise be 
the case (for a similar argument in the management of EU-US financial disputes see Posner 
                                                     
9 The European Parliament and in particular the British MEP rapporteur of the Solvency II directive, had also been vocal on 
this issue. 
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2009). It should, however, be noted that the embryonic solvency standards for insurers are 
still very general and not as advanced as those for banks.  
 
By taking a temporal dimension, the cases studies suggest that there has been an increasing 
active role of the EU in international financial harmonisation. There are three ways through 
which greater EU regulatory capacity is instrumental in promoting this outcome. First, a 
strong EU regulatory capacity enables a more coherent external projection of the EU not so 
much in international regulatory bodies, where the EU does not have a unified representation, 
but rather in bilateral relations. For example the decisions on the equivalence of third 
countries legislation are taken by the Commission, advised by the level 3 committees of 
supervisors.  
 
Second, the existence of EU regulatory templates (especially if they are based on maximum 
harmonisation) means not only that the EU has something to upload but also that different 
preferences of EU members states and their national industries have already been reconciled 
during intra EU negotiations. Hence, the EU is less likely to present a disjointed position in 
international fora.  
 
Third, EU rules that contain equivalence provisions or the like are instrumental in ‘cross-
loading’ EU regulatory templates to other countries. ‘Cross-loading’ is the incorporation of 
rules agreed in one jurisdiction into another jurisdiction, without the adoption of these rules 
by international regulatory fora. Cross-loading can occur either from the EU to third 
countries, first and foremost the US (‘active’ cross-loading); or from the US to the EU 
(‘passive’ cross-loading). Although this aspect is not examined in this research, strong EU 
regulatory capacity facilitates the active cross loading of EU rules.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This research investigates the influence of the EU in regulating global finance, asking what 
accounts for the EU’s ability (or the lack of it in certain cases) to foster international 
regulatory harmonisation. The conundrum is explained by different combinations of EU and 
international regulatory capacities, whereby the increased EU regulatory capacity in some 
financial services following the completion of EMU and the single financial market accounts 
for the greater ability of the EU to upload its rules.  
 
These findings feed into the IPE literature on financial harmonisation, showing that the EU 
plays an active role and a passive role. The passive role is more frequent than the active role 
because the EU, despite its market size, is still in the process of building up its regulatory 
capacity. Recently, it has done so with reference to rating agencies, hedge funds and over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives, so one could expect the EU to play an active role in uploading or 
cross-loading these rules. This research also innovatively links the literature on the politics of 
international financial harmonisation and EU financial regulation by looking at the external 
impact of EU institution building and the external effects of EU rules.    
 
The EU has responded to the crisis by strengthening its framework for financial supervision 
(the so-called de Larosiere architecture) and by reforming its policy templates for the 
regulation of certain financial activities (such as hedge funds and credit rating agencies). 
Moreover, the global financial crisis, which originated in the US and was seen as triggered by 
Lucia Quaglia 
14 
the Anglo Saxon model of financial capitalism, has undermined the legitimacy of the US 
predominance in regulating global finance (Helleiner and Pagliari 2011). It is too early to tell 
whether the crisis and the regulatory response to it have increased its ability to influence 
global regulation. This research, however, concludes that EU is now a (sui generis) player in 
the politics of international financial regulation and although it does not (yet) fully exploit its 
potential, it can no longer be ignored for a thorough understanding of international financial 
services regulation.  
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. I wish to acknowledge financial support from the European 
Research Council (204398 FINGOVEU). This paper was written while I was a visiting fellow 
at the Max Planck Institute in Cologne and the European University Institute in Florence. I 
wish to thank Nina Arbabzadeh for very professional research assistance. I am grateful to 
Dermot Hodson, Till Kaesbach, Patrick Leblond, Sylvia Maxfield, Alasdair Young, as well as 
the participants to the British International Studies Association (BISA) conference, the 
European Union Studies Association (EUSA) conference and the research seminar at the 
University of Cologne, for comments on an earlier draft of this paper 
 
The European Union and Global Financial Harmonisation 
15 
 
References 
 
Allen, F., and Gale, D. (2000), Comparing Financial Systems, Cambridge: MIT. 
Bach, D. (2010) ‘Varieties of cooperation: the domestic institutional roots of global 
governance’, Review of International Studies, 36, 3: 561–589. 
 
Bach, D. (2010) ‘Varieties of cooperation: the domestic institutional roots of global 
governance’, Review of International Studies, 36, 3: 561 -589. 
 
Bach, D. and Newman A. (2010a), ‘Governing Lipitor and Lipstick: Capacity, Sequencing, 
and Power in International Pharmaceutical and Cosmetics Regulation’, Review of 
International Political Economy 17, 4: 665-695. 
 
Bach, D. & Newman, A. (2010b), ‘Transgovernmental Networks and Domestic Policy 
Convergence: Evidence from insider trading regulation’, International Organisation, 64: 
505–28. 
 
Bach, D. and Newman A.L. (2007), ‘The European regulatory state and global public policy: 
Micro-Institutions, macro-Influence’, Journal of European Public Policy 14, 6: 1–20. 
 
Baker, A. (2010), ‘Restraining regulatory capture? Anglo-America, crisis politics and 
trajectories of change in global financial governance’, International Affairs, 86, 3: 647-–663. 
 
Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2010) Basel III: A Global Regulatory 
Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, Basel. 
 
Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (2005), Basel II: International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework, Basel.  
 
Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) (1988) Basel I: A Global Regulatory 
Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, Basel. 
 
Büthe, T. (2008), ‘Politics and Institutions in the Regulation of Global Capital:  A Review 
Article’, Review of International Organisations, 3, 2: 207–220. 
 
Cerny, P. (1995), ‘Globalisation and the Changing Logic of Collective Action. International 
Organisation, 49, 4: 595–625. 
 
Cohen, B.J. (1996), ‘Phoenix Risen: The resurrection of global finance, World Politics, 48, 2: 
268-296. 
 
Coleman, W. and Underhill, G.R.D. (1998), ‘Globalism, regionalism, and the emergence of 
international securities markets: The case of IOSCO and EU financial integration’ in Coleman 
W. and Underhill G.R.D. (eds), Regionalism and Global Economic Integration: Europe, Asia, 
and the Americas, London: Routledge: 223–48. 
 
Comité Européen des Assurances (CEA) (2007a) Solvency II, Diversification and 
Specialisation. Briefing Note, 1, May 2007, Brussels. 
Lucia Quaglia 
16 
 
Comité Européen des Assurances (CEA) (2007b) The Insurance Groups and Solvency II. 
Briefing Note, 2, May 2007, Brussels. 
 
Dimson, E. and P. Marsh (1995), ‘Capital Requirements for Securities Firms’, The Journal of 
Finance, 50, 3: 821–851. 
 
Donnelly, S. (2010), The Regimes of European Integration, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Drezner, D. (2010), ‘Is Historical Institutionalism Bunk?’, Review of International Political 
Economy, 17, 4: 791–804 . 
 
Drezner, D. W. (2007), All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Dür, A (2011), ‘Fortress Europe or open door Europe? The external impact of the EU’s Single 
Market in financial services’, Journal of European Public Policy, 45: 5, 771–787. 
 
European Parliament and Council of Ministers (2009), Directive 2009 /138/EC on the taking-
up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (recast). 
 
European Parliament and Council of Ministers (2002), Directive 2002/87/EC on the 
supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms 
in a financial conglomerate. 
 
Farrell, H. and Newman, A.L. (2010), ‘Making global markets: Historical institutionalism in 
international political economy’, Review of International Political Economy, 17, 4: 609—638. 
 
Ferran, E. (2004) Building an EU Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University press. 
 
George, A.L and Bennett, A. (2005), Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, MIT press. 
 
Helleiner, E. (1994), States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to 
the 1990s, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Helleiner, E. and S. Pagliari (2011), ‘The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? 
A Postcrisis Research Agenda’, International Organisation 65, Winter: 169–200. 
 
Howarth, D. and Quaglia, L. (2012), ‘The European Union and the domestic political 
economy of the Basel III accord’, paper presented at the College of Europe, Bruges. 
 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) (2008a) Standard No. 2.1.1 on the 
structure of regulatory capital requirements, October. 
 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) (2008b) Guidance paper No. 2.1.1 
on the structure of regulatory capital requirements, October. 
 
The European Union and Global Financial Harmonisation 
17 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) (2008c) Standard No. 2.2.6 on 
ERM for capital adequacy and solvency purposes, October 2008. 
 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) (2008d) Guidance paper No. 2.2.5 
on ERM for capital adequacy and solvency purposes, October.  
 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) (2008e) Standard No. 2.2.7 on the 
use of Internal Models for regulatory capital purposes, October. 
 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) (2008f) Guidance paper No. 2.2.6 
on the use of Internal Models for regulatory capital purposes, October. 
 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) (2008g) Guidance paper No. 3.5 on 
the mutual recognition of reinsurance supervision. 
 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) (2009a) Guidance Paper No. 3.7 on 
the role and responsibilities of a group-wide supervisor, October.  
  
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) (2009b) Guidance paper No. 3.8 on 
the use of supervisory colleges in group-wide supervision, October. 
 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) (2009c) Standard No. 2.1.2 on the 
structure of capital resources for solvency purposes, November.  
 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) (2009d) Guidance Paper No. 2.1.2 
on the structure of capital resources for solvency purposes, October.  
 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) (2010) Guidance paper on the 
treatment of non-regulated entities in group-wide supervision, April. 
 
International Monetary Fund (2011), United Kingdom: 2011 Article IV Consultation, Country 
Report No. 11/220. 
 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (2008) Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals For Credit Rating Agencies, May. 
 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (1989), Capital Adequacy 
Standards for Securities Firms, Report of the Technical Committee, October.  
 
Kapstein, E. (1992), ‘Between Power and Purpose: Central Bankers and the Politics of 
International Regulation’, International Organisation, 46, 1: 265–87. 
 
Kapstein, E. (1989), ‘Resolving the Regulator’s Dilemma: International Coordination of 
Banking Regulations’, International Organisation 43, 2: 323–47. 
 
Kerwer, D. (2005), ‘Rules That Many Use. Standards and Global Regulation’, Governance, 
18, 4: 611–632. 
 
Lucia Quaglia 
18 
Jabko, N. (2006), Playing the Market: A Political Strategy for Uniting Europe, 1985-2005, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Leblond, P.  (2011), EU, US and international accounting standards: A delicate balancing act 
in governing global finance’, Journal of European Public Policy, 18(3): 443–461. 
 
Macartney, H. (2010), Variegated Neoliberalism: EU Varieties of Capitalism and 
International Political Economy, London: Routledge. 
 
Macartney, H. (2009), 'Variegated Neo-liberalism: Transnationally oriented fractions of 
capital in EU financial market integration', Review of International Studies, 35: 451–480. 
 
Mattli, W. and Büthe, T. (2003), ‘Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality 
or Primacy of Power?’, World Politics, 56: 1–42. 
 
Mügge, D. (2010), Widen the Market, Narrow the Competition: Banker Interests and the 
Making of a European Capital Market, Colchester: ECPR. 
 
Mügge, D. (2006), ‘Reordering the marketplace: Competition politics in European finance’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, 5: 991–1022. 
 
Oatley, T and Nabors R. (1998). ‘Redistributive cooperation: market failures, wealth transfer 
and the Basle Accord, International Organisation, 52, 1: 35–54. 
 
Padoa-Schioppa, T. (2004), Regulating Finance: Balancing Freedom and Risk, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Porter, T. (2005), Globalisation and Finance, Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Porter, T. (2003), ‘Technical collaboration and political conflict in the emerging regime for 
international financial regulation’, Review of International Political Economy, 10, 3: 520–
551. 
 
Posner, E. (2010), ‘Sequence as explanation: the international politics of accounting 
standards’, Review of International Political Economy, 14, 4: 639–664. 
 
Posner, E. (2009), ‘Making rules for global finance: Transatlantic regulatory cooperation at 
the turn of the millennium’, International Organisation, 63: 665–99. 
 
Posner, E. and Véron, N. (2010) ‘The EU and financial regulation: Power without purpose?’, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 17, 3: 400–15.  
 
Quaglia, L. (2010), Governing Financial Services in the European Union, London: 
Routledge. 
 
Quaglia, L. (2007), ‘The Politics of Financial Service Regulation and Supervision Reform in 
the European Union’, European Journal of Political Research, 46, 2: 269–90. 
  
The European Union and Global Financial Harmonisation 
19 
Simmons, B. (2001), ‘The International politics of harmonisation: The case of capital market 
regulation’, International Organisation, 55: 589–620.  
 
Simmons, B. A. (1998), ‘Compliance with International Agreements,’ Annual Review of 
Political Science, 7/1, 75-93 
 
Singer D. A. (2004), ‘Capital rules: The domestic politics of international regulatory 
harmonisation’, International Organisation, 58: 531–565.  
 
Singer, D.A. (2007), Regulating capital: setting standards for the international financial 
system, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Story, J. and Walter, I. (1997), Political Economy of Financial Integration in Europe: The 
Battle of the Systems, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
Tsingou, E. (2010) ‘Transnational Governance Networks in the Regulation of Finance – the 
Making of Global Regulation and Supervision Standards in the Banking Industry’ in M. 
Ougaard and A. Leander (eds.) Business and Global Governance (London: Routledge) 138–
155. 
 
— (2008) ‘Transnational Private Governance and the Basel Process: Banking Regulation, 
Private Interests and Basel II’, in Andreas Nölke and Jean-Christophe Graz (eds.) 
Transnational Private Governance and its Limits, ECPR/Routledge series (London: 
Routledge), 58–68. 
 
Underhill, G.R.D (1997), ‘The making of the European financial area: Global market 
integration and the EU Single Market for financial service’, in Underhill G.R.D. (ed.) The 
New World Order in International Finance, London: Macmillan. 
 
Underhill, G. (1995) ‘Keeping governments out of politics: transnational securities markets, 
regulatory cooperation and political legitimacy’, Review of International Studies, 21, 3: 251–
78. 
 
Underhill, G.R.D, Blom, J. and Mügge, D. (eds.) (2010), Global Financial Integration Thirty 
Years On, Cambridge: Cambridge University press.  
 
Underhill, G.R.D., and Zhang X. (2008) ‘Setting the rules: private power, political 
underpinnings, and legitimacy in global monetary and financial governance’, 
International Affairs, 84, 3: 535–554. 
 
Wood, D. (2005), Governing Global Banking, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Lucia Quaglia 
20 
 
Table 1. EU-US Market Size of the Main Financial Services  
 
Banks Assets   2008 2009 Source  
  US ($) 12,321.0 11,665.6 FRB 
  EU ($) 48,528 44,532 ECB 
Securities* Securities 
Trading  
      
  US ($) 70,647 31,129 WFE 
  EU ($) 22,000 23,088 WFE 
Insurance Total Gross 
Premiums 
(life and 
non-life) 
      
  US ($) 1,620 2,024 OECD 
  EU (euro) 1,991 1,484 OECD 
 
*The figures correspond to the value of trades: number of trades in equities, bonds, and 
derivatives times their respective price. 
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